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LEGAL POSITION OF MANAGING DIRECTORS 
IN JAPANESE COMPANY LAW 
一-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE-
Kohgoro Y AMAGUCHI* 
9 
For the purpose of rationalizing the management structure of the 
company limited by shares (kabushikigaisha)， the reformed company law in 
1950 fundamentally changed the former directorial system. This system had 
originally been established in the former Commercial Code of 1890 which 
had provided a licence system for the incorporation of company. The Code 
was replaced by the present Commercial Code in 1899 which established the 
normative system for the formation of a company in Japan. This Code was 
amended in 1911 and 1938. Differently from other developed countries， 
it was expected from the beginning that the company 1imited by shares 
should be developed into the capital corporation in Japan; a company 
had to have more than three directors as a necessary organ of the 
company.I) 
It was already recognized in the former Commercial Code that funda-
mentally different from an incorporated partnership with 1imited liability 
(gδshigaisha， equivalent to societe en commandite or Kommanditgesell・
schaft) the company could not be represented by each of its shareholders; 
the existence of the directors as administrative organ was necessary to the 
company as well as its share capital stock. It was prescribed that“the 
general meeting of shareholders should elect more than three director~ 
among the shareholders"， and furthermore “the directors may appoint a 
* Professor of Commercial Law， Faculty of Law， Osaka University， LL.D.， (Kyoto Univ.) 
1) The Former Commercial Code Art. 185， para.1; The Commercial Code of 1899 Art.165; 
The Revised Code in 1938 Art.255. This was in contrast with other developed countries 
r 引
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rnanaging director who rnainly rnanages the cornpany"2) If each director 
were able to execute the business transactions respectively， itwould be 
irnpossible to keep the unity of rnanagernent in the cornpany. In order to 
keep the unity of rnanagernent， itwas perrnitted to appoint a rnanaging 
director and adopted the principle that regarding the irnportant business 
affairs in the rnanagement the directors' rneeting had to decide.3) We have to 
pay attention not only to the consideration to ensure the unity of rnanage事
rnent but also to the theory that the plural directors delegate their rnanaging 
powers which revert to the directors collectively to the rnanaging director 
elected by thernselves. 
With regard to the representation of cornpany in and out of court， the 
forrner Cornrnercial Code prescribed that “the directors have an exclusive 
right to hold agency for the cornpany over al the business transactions of 
cornpany in dealing with the third parties and in legal proceedings"， but 
their authority “should be restricted by the articles of incorporation or the 
resolutions of general rneeting" and “whether several directors rnay carry out 
the transactions respectively or rnust carry it out al together or in groups" 
had to be prescribed by the articles of incorporation or the resolution of 
general rneeting.4) So the directors of a cornpany lirnited by shares， different 
frorn the rnanaging partners in an incorporated partnership with lirnited 
1iabi1ty， had only the authority to bind the cornpany within the lirnits of the 
articles of incorporation or the resolutions of shareholders; their authorities 
had been restricted by the prescriptions such as “the directors have no 
deciding power of agency exclusively" concerning certain rnatters or 
“they cannot carry out the business transactions respectively" as to the 
several directors.S) This is the contrast to the case in an incorporated 
partnership with unlirnited liability (gδme恕aisha，equivalent to soci白een 
norn collectif or offene Handersgesellschaft);“Each partner can execute the 
2) The Former Commercial Code Art.185: the Draft Code by Roesler Arts.219 and 224. The 
Roesler's Draft had begun to be drawn up in 1881 and was completed in 1884. The Draft Code was 
decreed in 1889 as the form巴rCommercial Code. 
3) H. Rosler， The Draft Commercial Code， The First Book， 1884， p.397; T. Hasegawa & T. 
Kishimoto， Shδho Seigi (Commentary on Commercial Code)， 2nd Vo1.l890， p.436. 
4) The Former Commercial Code Art.186= 143. The Draft Code by Roesler Art.222. 
5) Hasegawa & Kishimoto， op. cit.， pp.297 and 300. 
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whole business affairs and also can proceed the power validly".6) Namely， in
an incorporated partnership， each partner has rights and duties of executing 
the business transactions in the. capacity of partner as a rule and he qua 
partner has the agency of the whole business of the firm in terms of the 
character of partnership. 
In a company limited by shares， however， the agency of the directors 
could be restricted completely and that restriction could be asserted to the 
third party as a general rule. The legal position of the directors were based 
on the delegation of the company， and so it was generally interpreted that 
neither any power nor any authority except the delegated matters they 
had.7) Consequently， inthe case of an incorporated partnership the restric-
tion to the agency of partner couldnot be asserted to the third party 
absolutely， but as to a company it was prescribed that the restriction to the 
agency of the directors were effective and was not opposable to only the 
bona-fide third party. 8) 
2 
The Japanese Commercial Code of 1899， however， apart from the 
legislations of foreign countries established the principle of respective 
representation， and prescribed without exception that “the directors 
should represent the company respectively"9). But， asto this system， the 
risk against the benefit of the company and large shareholders had been 
recognized strongly by the business world and foreign capital， and especially 
according to the demand of foreign capital induction the principle of the 
joint or collective representation was expected to be adopted. 
Consequen tly， in1911 it was revised that only if there was no provision 
in the artic1es of incorporation nor decision in the general meeting about the 
person who should represent the company exclusively (so-called managing 
director)， or about that the several directors or the directors and managers 
6) The Draft Code by Roesler Art.118， and the Former C~mmercial Code Art.l09. 
7) R邑sler，op.cit.， p.399; Hasegawa & Kishimoto， op. cit.， pp.304 and 437. 
8) The Former Commercial Code Arts.lll vs. 186=144; the Draft Code by Roesler Arts.121 
vS.222. 
9) The Commercial Code Art.17 0， para. 1. 
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should jointly represent the company (so-called joint representation or 
mixed representation)， the directors had to represent the company respec-
tively.10) 
Later， in the revised Commercial Code of 1938， the principle of the 
respective representation of al the directors was adopted as a general rule. 
But， the managing director orthe joint representation as well as mixed 
representation could be presじribedby the artic1es of incorporation or the 
resolution of general meeting. And， moreover， itadopted the system in which 
the directors who represented the company should have been elected by the 
co田optationamong the directors based on the provision in the articles of 
incorporationY) As a matter of fact， we could see many examples of the 
artic1es which provided that the executive president and other managing 
directors had to be elected by co-optation. And it was generally interpreted 
that when there were several managing directors in the company， each of 
them had the authority to represent it respectively unless the artic1es other幽
wise provided. Besides， itwas provided that， ifthere were any director who 
did not represent the company， the name of a representative director should 
be regjstered at the commercial register as well as the provisions in the 
artic1es of incorporation concerning the joint or mixed representation.12) 
On the other hand， according to the Commercial Code of 1899 the busi・
ness affairs of the company were to be decided by the majority of the direc-
tors unless the artic1es otherwise provided， and the revised Code in 1938 
maintained that provision.13) Regarding the resu1tion by means of the 
majority， itwas general1y interpreted that al1 of the directorsshould have 
directed the business affairs unanimously and if they did not agree they 
should have executed according to the decision by the majority.14) There 
was no restriction for forming the resolution by majority and it was not 
necessary that al1 the directors expressed their opinions at a meeting and 
decided by majority， but it was enough to decide by obtaining the approval 
of each director in turn. In fact， in most large companies the meeting of 
10) Th巴RevisedCode of 1911 Art.170， para. 1. 
11) The Reviced Code of 1938 Art.26 1. 
12) Ibid.Art.188，para.l，nos.l0and 11. And also，see Art. 12. 
13) The Commercial Code of 1899 Art. 169. The Revised Code of 1938 Art.260. 
14) J. Matsumoto， ChushakuKabushikな.aisha-hδ(CommentaryonCompany Law)， 1948， p.140. 
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directors delibereted over the important matters， and the ordinary or daily 
business was left to the the decision of the executive president and other 
managing directors. The artic1es which provided as aforesaid were regarded 
as lawful under the prevailing view. 15) 
As to the legal structure of the directors as an organ of the company 
abovementioned， they had conflicts and contradictions which has influenced 
an interpretation of the present law， because they thought that the majority 
principle concerning the direction of company business was not compatible 
with the system of the respective representation. But 1 think the standard of 
c1assification between the system of the respective direction and the system 
of the collective direction should be based on whether the power of directing 
business affairs belongs to several persons collectively or to each person 
respectively. As to the provision that the business affairs of a company 
should be decided with the majority of the directors， the power of directing 
business affairs belongs to al the directors collectively (the principle of 
collective direction). The principle of collective direction is not inconsistent 
with the system of the respective representation， and so al the directors 
having the power collectively can， by way of delegating the power， make 
each of them to conduct outwardly and have the effect of the conduct 
revert to the company. 
The view which takes the principle of respective direction on the busi幽
ness affairs of an incorporated partnership with un1imited liability is logical， 
for the incorporated partnership is the typication of a so-called personal 
corporation (individualistische Gesellschaft). But we should not. take it 
for granted that we can apply this view to the management of a company 
limited by shares (so-called capital corporation). The direction of the 
company as a pure capital corporation is essentially corrective， and ex-
c1ude尽theprinciple of respective direction which is found in the partnership 
and other personal associations. 1 have already stated the theoretical 
structure in the former Commercial Code of 1890 which distincted c1early 
the method of the managerial direction in an incorporated partnership from 
that of a company incorporated. In French law， before providing the system 
of the board of directors (conseil d'administration) the directors of a 
15) lbid. p.141. 
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company with limited liabi1ity (societe anonyme) could not conduct and 
represent the company respectively， because the delegation to the directors 
of a company had essentially a collective nature， whi1e the managing partners 
of an incorporated partnership were able to conduct and represent it 
respectively.16) Similarly， regarding the business affairs of an incorporated 
partnership with unlimited liability in German Commercial Code， the 
respective direction is the principle and， corresponding to thisthe respective 
representation by each member is the principle.17) As to the business affairs 
of a company limited by shares (Aktiengesellschaft)， however， the collective 
representation was provided as principle from the former German 
Commercial Code through the time of the Commercial Code of 1897 to the 
Companies Code in 1937. Moreover， the reformed Companies Code of 1965 
provides clearly the system of collective direction corresponding to the 
collective representation.18) Here， ithas been recognized that the election 
of several directors in a company always implies the collective delegation to 
them and in principle they can only conduct collectively.19) In England， 
regarding the partnership， each partner conducts the business affairs as 
others' agent and is liable for the obligations of the firm personally and 
unlimitedly; while， regarding the c01l1pany limited by shares， itis the 
principle in common law that if a company has two or more directors they 
should always compose a board， and each director is only a member of the 
body of directors to which the power of managing the company reverts 
collectively.20) 
As mentioned above， the principle of collective direction concerning the 
directors of a company limited by shares is accepted widely in the laws of 
foreign countries. Historical1y， ithas been understood that the directors are 
16) P. Pic et 1. Kreher， Des SocietesComm巴rciales，3me Ed.， Tom巴2，1948， Nos.2049 et 2050， 
and cf lbid.， Tom巴 1，1940， Nos.495 et 496. See also， Loi du 24 juillet 1966 Arts. 13 et 14 concern-
ing incorporated partnership (societe巴nnom colIectif). 
17) Handelsges巴tzbuchSS. 115 und 125. 
18) Handelsgesetzbuch S.232; Aktienges巴tzvon 1937 S.71; Aktiengesetz von 1965 SS. 77 und 
78. 
19) W. Endeman， Handbuch des Deutschen Handels"， See-und Wechselrechts， Band 1， 1881， S 
577. 
20) F. B. Palmer， Company Law， 5th Ed.， 1905， pp.6 amd 7; Halsbury's Law of England， 
Simonds Ed.， Vol. 6， Companies， by Cohen & Walton， 1954， p.316. 
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in the position of exercising the control over the properties of a company 
like the managing partners of an incorporated partnership with unlimited 
liability， inspite of not assuming any personal liability for the debts of a 
company.21) Similarly， inJapan the directorial system of the company has 
been the collectively constituent organ since the former Commercial Code 
of 1890. Such an organ consisted of the directors as a body has delegated 
its power of the direction which consisted in it collectively to each director 
respresenting the company respectively. That is the system of respective 
representation. 
3 
In the revised Commercial Code of 1950， the business affairs of a 
company 1imited by shares shou1d be decided by the board of directors 
(torishimariyαk怯 kai)consisted of al1 the directors.22) At the same time， the 
Code provides that “the board of directors shall select a director or 
directors who represent the company (daihyδtorishimariyaku) among 
them".23) Regarding the managing directors， they may represent the 
company collectively if there are several managing directors.24) And it is 
prescribed that the name of the managing director or directors should be 
registered at the commercia1 register as well as the provisions in the articles 
of incorporation concerning the collective representation by managing 
directors.25) Thus， the reformed 1aw in 1950 abolished the former system of 
the respective respresentation by al1 the directors， and settled the managing 
director or directors to be a necessary organ of the company. 
According to the traditiona1 theory， the reason why the law prescribes 
that the board of directors should decide the business affairs of a company， 
would be to make it clear that the power to manage the company business 
is vested collectively in the directors as a whole. Then， various views 
have seriously been conflicted concerning how to understand the legal 
21) Endernan， a.a. 0.， S.576. 
2) The Cornrnercial Code Art. 260. 
23) Ibid. Art. 261， para. 1. 
24) Ibid. Art. 261， para. 2. 
25) Ibid. Art. 188， para. 2， nos. 8 and 9. se also Ibid. Arts. 12 and 262. 
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structure of the directorial system under the reformed law， as the core 
problem in the organization of company management. 
The majority view wholly transmitted the conceptional composition of 
the former law， separates the management of a company's business affairs 
into the decision of the will and the execution itself of that decision.26) On 
this standpoint， the supportors of the majority view understand that the 
decision of the will regarding the business affairs vests in the board of 
directors exc1usively and only the execution itself of that decision belongs to 
the managing directors. Thus， they interprete that this power of decision 
should be delegated to the managing directors by the artic1es of incorpora-
tion or the resolution of the board of directors， because the power of the 
decision regarding the business affairs inherently vests in the board of 
directors; and solely with that delegation， the managing directors can first 
decide the will concerning the business transaction. Under this view it may 
be inferred that the delegation of the power for the decision of the will 
concerning the ordinary and usual business is implied with the selection of 
the managing directors.27) If we depend upon this conceptional composi-
tion， the managing directors would not have even the power of decision of 
will on the ordinary and usual business transactions. And so， we should be 
obliged it to interprete that their conducts can not help being invalid as a 
legal act (Rechtsgeschaft)， by reason that the act does not base on the deci-
sion of the wi1l， not only when there is no decision by the board of directors 
for giving the power concerning the affairs beyond the ordinary or usual 
business， but also when there is no delegation regarding the affairs within the 
ordinary and usual business transactions. 
We should interprete， ifwe reconstruct in terms of ours， that al the 
powers of decision concerniIig the business affairs of a company belong 
exclusively to the board of directors， and those powers are delegated to the 
managing directors. But if we consider in accordance with the theory of the 
26) T. Suzuki & T. Ishii， Kaisei Kabushikigaisha-hδKaisetsu (Comments on the Revised 
Company Law)， 1950， pp. 141 and 157; J. Mazuda & C. Suzuki， Jokai Kabushikigaisha-ho (Com-
mentary on Company Law)， 1st Vol.， 1951， p.280. contra: K. Osumi & T. Omori， Chikujo Kaisei 
Kaisha-hδKaisetsu (Comments on the Revised Company Law)， 1951， p.258. 
27) T. Suzuki， Kaisah-hδ(Treatise on Company Law)， Revis巴dEd. 1965， p.131; S. Tanaka， 
Kaisha・hoShδron (Treatise on Company Law)， 1st Vol. 1967， p.467. 
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delegation of power， the managing directors need the general or special 
delegation in regard to the affairs of the ordinary or usual business trans-
actions， asthe resuIts that the powers of decision belong excIusively to the 
board of directors. This theory makes the legal position of the managing 
directors very uncIear and unstable in the company， asfor the problem of 
the management's situation in the reformed law; this theory is also the late 
thought considering the fact that aI the powers of decision are not inherent-
ly held by them. The theory which permit the managing directors to be in 
the position to do only the ministerial acts is against the common tendency 
of the separation of the direction from the administration in the manage-
ment structure of modern companies. 
In order to rationalize the management structure of a company limited 
by shares， the reformed law in 1950 reduced the powers of the general 
meeting of shareholders and concentrated broad powers into the 
directors， and kept the balance by adding a board system to the directors for 
the purpose of ensuring the careful and adequate exercise of the powers of 
the directors. The board system needs， asa coroIIary of its nature， not only 
a person who executes its resolution， but also a person who decides by 
himself and executes the daily business which should be constantly dea1t 
with. Namely， asthe resu1t of the introduction of the board system， the 
managing directors necessarily should execute the resolution of the board 
and should decide and execute the ordinary and regular business of the 
company. Accordingly， itshould be understood that the managing directors 
have an inherent or original power to do al the acts in and out of court 
concerning the regular business management (so岨calleddirection)， and within 
the sphere of that powers， the managing directors do not need the delegation 
from the board of directors. In other words， under the traditional theory of 
the delegation of power， the legal position of the managing directors is only 
that of subordinate agent (mandataire substituee) based on the doctrine of 
voluntary delegation， and their powers are merely dependent on the given 
delegation. We should pay attention， however， to the facts that this is not 
different from the structure of management organ in the former French 
Companies Act of 1867ヲ andmoreover the weakest point in it is the 
dispersion of the responsibility among the d 
18 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [No.26 
and the factual irresponsibility of them.28) The notion that the managing 
directors are the delegates of the board of directors， no longer represents the 
reality. 
4 
In order to grasp the responsibility of the directors in a company limited 
by shares more precisely and more effectively， itis necessary to make exact 
the division of duties and functions between the managing directors and the 
board of directors. 
Under the present positive law in Japan， we cannot regard the managing 
directors an organ perfectly separate and independent from the board of 
directors， and the managing directors stil have a character being attached to 
the board of directors. The managing director or directors are elected among 
the members of the board and at any time dismissed by the board of 
directors. As an ideal matter， however， we can find a perfect differentiation 
between the managing directors and the board of directors. For the purpose 
of rea1izing this， we should throw light on the specialization concerning the 
capacity and the power of each organ. 
First of al， the capacity of the managing director himself besides that of 
a director qua a member of the board of directors， should be established. 
Recently， the theory which recognizes the existence of a legal relationship 
between a managing director and the company， separated from the one 
between a director and the company， becomes influenciaJ.29) In English 
company law as well， the theory which recognizes the managing director as a 
“primary organ"30) is becoming. But， asyet in Japan we find a view which 
stil denies the existence of the legal relationship between a managing director 
and the compaily. 31) This is the theory which ignores the division of the 
duties between the managing director and the other ordinary directors， and 
therefore goes against the idea and tendency of the separation between the 
28) K. Yamaguchi， Kaisha.torishimariyaku.seido no Hotekikδzo (Legal Structure of Company 
Directors)， 1973， p.l03. 
29) K. Osumi， Kaisha-ho-ron (Treatise on Company Law)， 2nd Vol. 1959， p.114. 
30) L.C.B. Gower， The Principles ofModern Company Law， 2nd Ed. 1957， p.13l. 
31) cf. Yamaguchi，op. cit.， p.229. 
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managing directors and the board of directors. It seems that such a theory is 
suitable only to the limited private company (yugengaisha， equivalent to 
societ己aresponsabilite 1imitee or Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung) 
which each director qua director has inherently the power to manage the 
company or the principle of respective representation and execution by each 
of the directors before the amendment in 1950. 
Secondly， under the majority view that a1 the powers of decision 
concerning the business affairs of the company vest in the board of 
directors and the powers can be delegated to the managing directors by a 
resolution of the board or the articles of incorporation， and then the 
managing directors are able to determine about the execution of the 
resolution only after that delegation， itis natural resu1t that the managing 
directors should obey to the decision by the board of directors if there were 
a resolution. On the contrary， under the view of which the managing 
directors have inherently a1 the powers concerning the ordinary and regular 
business transactions of the company， we should look for the reason about 
the binding force by the board of directors in the supremacy of the 
hierarchic system of the company structure. Needless to say， it is natural 
that the resolution of the board of directors binds the managing directors 
about doing the execution of the resolution of the board， asthe powers 
of exercising the office just originate in the authorization from the board 
of directors. But 1 doubt whether the board of directors can interfere or 
direct with regard to the exercise of the inherent power of managing 
directors. Under the present positive law of Japan， aslong as the board .of 
directors has a1 the power to manage the company， itis one of the inter-
pretations that the board of directors should put the managing directors 
under its superintendence and control， and can interfere and direct them.32) 
Moreover， there is no provision in Japanese company law according to 
which the managing director should direct the company“unter eigener 
Verantwortung" like in the German new Company Code of 196533) or 
should undertake the direction “sous sa responsabilite" like in the French 
34) 
new Company Code in 1966.-" Nevertheless， solong as the definition in 
32) Osumi， op. cit.， p.118. 
33) Aktienges巴tzvon 1965 S. 76， para. 1 
34) Loi du 24 jui1let 1966 Art. 113， para. 1 
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the division of powers in the management organization is thought to be 
indispensable for the establishment of the directors' responsible system， we 
should interprete that the power for executing the ordinary and regular 
business affairs which belong to the direction， nwerts exclusively to the 
managing directors， the organ of direction， and that the board of directors 
should be principally restricted its responsibility to the control over the 
results of managerial direction by the managing direじtors.
The theory which gives higher priority to the hierarchy of organization 
over the principle of taking a division of the organs' powers， comes to 
presence even under the law of France where the managing directors are sti1l 
in a position of the delegates of the board of directors (consei1 d'administra帯
tion).35) Under the company law of England a1ike that of France， itis 
pointed out that the circumstances may be brought about; the circumstances 
are that the board of directors cannot interfere in the exercise of the powers 
by the managing directors based on the model artic1es of association which 
express the will of legislator， providing that th.子 boardof directors may 
entrust a part of its powers to the managing directors to the exclusion of its 
36 ) own powers. ~V ， 
On the other hand， even when a company limited by shares does not 
have a formal dualist structure like in Germany (Vorstand and 
Aufsichtsrat)， the division of directors into executive and non-executive 
groups can operate so as to produce a simi1ar separation of function with the 
non-managing directors exercising the supervisory tunciton in regard to the 
conducts of direction by the managing directors. This phenomenon has been 
observed for a fact in Japan as well as in France and England.37) But， it is 
clear thatan informal separation of function does not provide the same 
guarantees as a formal separation. Moreover， in many cases the non-
managing directors do not have supervisory funcitons at al， and would find 
it very difficu1t to exercise such functions even if they wished to do so， by 
reason of their dependence in fact upon the leadership by the managing 
35) J. Noirel， La Societe Anonyme devant la Jurisprud巴nceModerne， 1958， p.255. 
36) Gower，op. cit.， pp.131 and 132. 
37) cf Commision of the European Communities， Employee Participation and Company Struc-
ture， 1975， p.20. 
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directors. Hence， itis necessary to make exact the division between the 
managing directors and the board of directors. Some kind of a dua1ist 
structure has been made available on a mandatory basis as to the large 
companies and stock quoted companies in Japan.38) The supervisor or 
supervisors (kansayaku) are charged with the control over the activities of 
business affairs by the directors on behalf of the shareholders.39) Being 
elected by the general meeting of shareholders， however， also the supervisor 
or supervisors are in fact subject to the managing directors who have the 
power to propose the candidate for supervisor to the general meeting.40) 
The Japanese company law has no limit concerning the number of the 
managing director， and then does not prevent not only more than half of 
the members of the board but al of them from becoming the managing 
directors. The law only prescribes that several managing directors may 
represent the company collectively.41) It is the prevailing view in Japan that 
when there are several managing directors， each of them can represent the 
company respectively. . But 1 insist on securing the unity of the managerial 
direction and preventing the dispersion of the responsibility. Though it is 
usual practice in J apan that even if there are several managing directors the 
directorial unity would bemaintained by means of the leadership relation 
amQng them， inthe eyes of the law the company is sti1 bound by the 
conduct of each managing director who represents it respectively. Further-
more， the practice which leaves the unity of direction to the inside 
autonomy under the articles of incorporation of the company， may make 
the respective responsibi1ity vague in law. It is not necessarily c1ear whether 
the principle of respective direction corresponding to the system of the 
respective representation is generally adopted by the prevai1ing view. 
Hereupon again， 1 think， the power of directing business affairs of the 
company belongs to al the managing directors collectively; the principle of 
collective direction is not inconsistent with the system of respective repre-
38) The Exception Act on th巴CompanySupervision concerning the Commercial Code in 1974 
Art. 1. 
39) Th巴CommercialCode Art. 274 
40) But， cf Ibid. Art. 275-3: "A supervisor may state his opinion on the appointement or 
removal of an supervisor at the general meeting of shareholders." 
41) Ibid. Art. 261， para. 2. 
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sentation， so al the managing directors having the power col1ectively can by 
way of delegating the power make each of them to conduct outwardly and 
have the effect of the conducts revert to the company. 
5 
In Japanese company law， the standard concerning the duty of care 
required to a director or a managing director is “the care of good administra時
tor (diligentia boni patris fam ilias) " 42) ， which is the degree of care required 
objectively to the person in profession or status of certain kind. 
The board of .directors should have the duties of control over its 
delegated and authorized matters to the managing directors， and over the 
matters relative to the direction by the managing directors having the 
inherent power， because of its higher rank in the hierarchy of a company 
organization. There is， however， a difference between the extent and 
contents of the duty of care charged on a member of the board of directors 
and that of a managing director. Because， but for this difference， there 
would be no significance recognizing the differentiation between the two 
organs and their functions. Accordingly， also the degree itself concerning 
the duty of care required to the managing director of a company limited by 
shares should be higher than one of the other non-managing director of a 
company or director of a limited private company. Above al， 1 think， the 
requisite of ability as a professional of the company management should be 
imposed upon the managing director. 
Now that the non remuneration principle of the managing-directorship is 
already anachronism in proportion as the advance of the separation of the 
direction from the administration in the management structure of modern 
companies， and so long as the remuneration should be fundamentally 
balanced with the responsibility， itwill be recommended that the degree 
concerning the duty of care should be elevated as a corollary of high 
remuneration. Especially， asthe opposite that the managing directors have 
an inherent and exclusive power in regard to the direction of a company， itis 
42) lbid. Art. 254， para. 3 =The Civil Code Art. 644. 
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necessary that the requisite of professional ability in the capacity of a 
managing director should be imposed upon him、withoutleaving the problem 
concerning the responsibility of managing director to the autonomy within 
the company any more.43) Under English company law， the degree of 
ability required to be exercised by a director is merely that which can 
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience.44) 
Accordingly， provided only that he is honest， a person with no knowledge or 
experience of business may safely accept a position as director. In other 
words， the ability which a director is required to have， isnot the one which 
should be objectively required of professional. It has been pointed out， 
however， that there is no reason why a managing director in the capacity of 
professional would have a judicial indulgence which the layman director had 
been granted in the past. A1though the objective standard concerning the 
abi1ity required to be exercised by a manaing director has not been yet 
estab1ished， itis acknowledged that the position of managing director is 
becoming professiona1ized through the increasing legal recognision and， with 
the development of a class of company's managers a trend towards estab-
lishing the objective standard can be seen.45) In American company law as 
well， there is a theory that the director of saving bank has tacidly shown an 
implied warranty for fitness to his office， and he cannot excuse himself for 
not having that qua1ity.46) In fact， the tendency for the application of the 
legal maxim “Imperitia culpae adnumeratur" has been emphasized to be 
called into question.47) 
Thus， the thought which leaves the problem of the fitness of managing 
director concerning his business judgement to the laissezてfairerelief for the 
shareholders who have chosen that director， should be abandoned. There-
fore， not “the diligence， care and skil which ordinary prudent man would 
exercise under similar circumstances in his personal affairs"， but “care which 
43) In England， ithad been said "if the shareholders invest their mon巴yin some peanut， they 
shall accept a monkey as dividends". It means that the shareholders sowe in case of the election of 
directors， and so they should reap what they have sown. But the law left it completely to the share-
holders' laissez-faire. see， however， L.S. Sealy， The Director as Trustee， C.L.J. 1967， p.l01. 
44) Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. (1925) Ch. 407. 
45) Sealy， op. cit.， p.lOl. 
46) Hun v. Cary， 82 N.Y. 65 (1880). 
47) see Yamaguchi， op. cit.， p.19. 
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ordinary prudent managing director wou1d exercise when he is managing the 
company" shou1d be required as to the degree of care. For examp1e， the 
German law had required a managing director (Vorstandmitg1ied) of 
company limited by shares to exercise “the care of ordinary businessman 
(die Sorgfalt eines ordent1ichen Geschaftsmann)".48) This was the same care 
which the present law has required from a d-irector (Geschaftsfuhler) of a 
limited private company.49) That was generally interpreted as the care which 
an ordinary merchant had to exercised as regards a commercial bJ.lsiness.50) 
In the furtherance， however， the Companies Code in 1937 required “the care 
of ordinary and sincere managing director (die Sorgfa1t eines ordentlichen 
und gewissenhaften Geschafts1eiters)ぺwhichwas succeeded to the new 
CompaniesCode of 1965 as the same.51) This acknowledged a peculiar type 
of the duty of care to the managing director of company limited by 
shares:52) We shou1d pay notice that the higher duty of care is required of a 
managing director by the a1teration from the word “businessman" to 
“managing director". 
The changing process in foreign 1aws concerning the standard of the duty 
of care required from the managing directors of a company shows that in 
proportion to the increasing importance of the company limited by shares in 
social and economic 1ife， the degree of that duty has gradually been e1evated. 
Above al， itis noteworthy that .the standard concerning the duty of care 
is c1assified according to each profession or status. This c1assification 
wou1d be impossible if a peculiar type of the duty of care were not sett1ed as 
to the company's managing director. In order to settle the responsibi1ty of 
the managing directors for a company more precise1y and more efficiently in 
Japanese company 1aw， itis necessary to make exact the differentiation of 
powers and the division of duties among the directors. However， in Japan 
there is no 1egis1ative trend towards the dualist structure of company's 
organs within the context of the Fifth Draft Directive of the European 
48) Hande1sgesetzbuch S.241， para. 1. 
4ヲ)Gesetz betr. GrnbH. S. 43， para. 1. 
50) Staub's Kornrnentar zurn Hande1sgesetzbuch， 11 Aufl. Band 1， 1921， S. 862 und 104. 
51) Aktiengesetz von 1937 S. 84， para. 1， Satz 1; Aktiengesetz von 1965 S. 93， para. 1， Satz. 1. 
52) Godin & Wilhe1rni， Aktienges巴tzvon 6. Sept. 1965， Kornrnentar， Band 1， 1967， S.462. 
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Communities53); the so柳called two鋤tier board system has not been 
introduced into J apan. And the directors have the duty to exercise their 
powers in good faith in the interests of the company as a whole. In other 
words， a director of the company owes the duty of loyalty to the company 
which has the effect that he must regard to the interests of the shareholders 
generally.54) After al， the directors have the duty to exercise their powers 
bona fide for the purpose for which they were conferred， i.e.， for the benefit 
of the shareholders as a whole who compose a company exc1usively under 
the Japanese company law. Nevertheless， itwill be essential to divide the 
company's management organ into the managing directors as an organ of the 
direction and the board of directors asan organ of the administration in 
accordance with the separation of the direction from the administration in 
the legal structure of modern companies. 
53) Proposition d'un巴 cinquiemedirective tendant a coordonner les garanties qui sont exigees 
dans les Etats membres， des societes， au sens de l'artic1e 58， paragraphe 2， du traite， pour proteger les 
interets， tant des associes que des tiers en ce qui concerne la structure des societes anonymes ainsi que 
les pouvoirs et obligations de leurs organes， presentee par la Commission au Conseille 9 octobre 1972. 
54) The Commercial Code Art. 254-2:“the directors shall be obliged to obey any law or 
ordinance and the articles of incorporation as well as resolutions adopted at a general meeing of share-
holders and to perform their duties faithfully on behalf of the company". 
